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JAPAN -- THE REGION AND THE WORLD

Japan is now the world's second greatest economic power.
At current exchange rates its per capita income is higher than
ours.

It is moving to number one in many areas of advanced

technology which we once dominated.

The power of the yen is

transforming Japan into a financial, as well as industrial,
giant.

The world's largest creditor, Japan finances a big

chunk of the

u.s.

budget deficit and thereby helps lower

interest rates in the

u.s.

At the same time, its economic relations not only with the

u.s.

but with other countries are already the source of

conflict.
history.

The Japanese trade surplus is the biggest in
The great Pacific economic power--and one of our

closest allies and friends-- finds itself attacked in the
Congress, in ASEAN, and by the EC.

u.s.

China and Korea complain.

How this great industrial and financial powerhouse adjusts to
this mounting criticism is of great importance to all of us.
In my view the two events of greatest importance to
U.S.-Japan relations during the past year were the near 50 per
cent appreciation of the yen and the overwhelming electoral
victory of Prime Minister Nakasone's Liberal Democratic Party
in the July general election.

The former has brought a
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reduction in the volume of Japan's exports and should in a few
months result in improvement in the bilateral trade imbalance.
It also has hastened the transformation of the Japanese economy.
The latter should be seen as a confirmation of the
direction of Japanese policy--and of Japan's membership in the

(

-·

The LDP victory was the result of several factors.
-- First, there is general satisfaction with the present

( state of affairs in Japan.
j

Despite high prices and creeping

unemployment, Japanese are living better than ever.
-- Second, the LDP is well-organized, its leadership highly
talented, and its workers dedicated.
-- Third, organized labor's support for the socialist party
was weakening faster than previously thought--largely assisted
by the privatization of several public corporations.
Fourth, voters did not see the opposition as a credible
alternative.
--Most importantly the extraordinary popularity of the
prime minister helped a number of voters decide in favor of the
LDP.

Although few in the party will admit it, Mr. Nakasone's

personal popularity--at record levels for the past two
years--was a major factor in the LDP victory.
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election result will assure continuity and

stability--including the continuation in office for another
year or more of the prime
~~,~~.

minister--~

~8

~eG8•~0~

However, the LDP victory should not be viewed as a

sign that the adjustment of our relations will be quicker, or
that it will be any easier for Japan to undertake the reforms
which are necessary.

The increase in the LDP Lower House seats

likely mean an increase in the influence of special
interest groups which are resistant to change.
Nonetheless, Prime Minister Nakasone remains the strongest
advocate of
Japan.

maF~et

opening and the "internationalization" of

He is ahead of the mainstream of his party ~nd of much

of the bureaucracy.

Be

has a greater appreciat on for Japan's

role and the impact Japan has on the world e6onomy.

we can

count on him to continue the fight to en~nce the free trade
system, but we must realize that his ppwer is restricted by the

nat~
~

of the political system.

Nakasone is a complex individual.

Before becoming/prime

'
( minister he was widely regarded as a strong nationalist.

He

~

was viewed with suspicion by many for fear he would turn Japan

1

,

'

dangerously to the right jeopardizing the progress toward
genuinely representative institution~f since the war.

Many

people worried that Nakasone would become a Japanese Gaullist
\
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carV~' oUt

a Japanese role at our expense.

~' Mr.

~

Nakasone~turned

out to be a pragmatist and

a strong believer in the importance of a close U.S.-Japan
relationship.

While he has not discarded his agenda to restore

national pride and revamp some postwar institutions, he has
proven to be one of Japan's most broad-minded, internationalist
prime ministers.

He has worked hard at diplomatic tasks--the

special "Ron-Yasu" relationship is genuine.
Mr. Nakasone is likely to remain in office through next
year's ordinary Diet session--May or June.
anybody's guess.
roll.

After that, it's

He might step down while he is still on a

Or, he might stay in office until the end of 1988.

don't know who will take his place.
three "new leaders" almost weekly.

I

The odds change on the
While Mr. Nakasone has been

very helpful to us, all three new leaders are moderate,
experienced statesmen who believe that Japan cannot exist
without the closest relationship with the United States; they
have built their careers on this belief.
As far as

u.s.

we know all three.

interests are concerned, the change of

leadership, when it comes, will be one of style, not substance.
While some Japanese are becoming irritated with Congress'
verbal attacks and with wave after wave of trade negotiators
taking up increasingly sensitive issues, most of the
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establishment is aware that Japan cannot avoid taking actions
to preserve the free market trading system.

Most understand

that whether foreign accusations of protectionist practices are
right or wrong, Japan's $60 billion surplus with the rest of
the world could lead to disaster for Japan and for the whole
trading system if doors close for Japanese products.

Many

outsiders consider the Japanese insular or even arrogant--I do
not--but most Japanese are aware that they live in an
interdependent world.
In the past 40 years Japan's foreign policy has been low
key but, effective.

Japan has recently become more active.

Of

particular note has been an expanded dialogue with the soviet
Union

which~ ~Peb~8~y

lead to a summit early next year.

Gorbachev's more flexible diplomacy puts some pressure on Japan
to respond and Mr. Nakasone has a sense of history that will
draw him toward the first summit between a Japanese prime
minister and a Soviet leader in more than 15 years.

There is

little inclination, however, in any party or in the government
to compromise on the main issue:
Territories.

return of the Northern

Without a territorial concession by the Soviets,

progress is unlikely.

In contrast to the 1970s when energy was

expensive and Japan looked to the Soviet Union as a growth
market, there is now a surplus of most commodities Japan
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needs.

And, the Japanese are wary of Soviet interest in high

technology.

Thus, while a summit will probably take place, t he

results are likely to be cosmetic rather than substantive.
Japan has continued to develop its relations with China and
Korea, successfully overcoming the setbacks that resulted from
the textbook problem and ill-conceived remarks by former
Education Minister Fujio.

Mr. Nakasone's visit to the opening

of the Asian games in Seoul represents his laudable commitment
to stabilizing Japan-ROK relations.

His visit to China next

month should further improve relations as well as send a signal
to the soviets that he intends to pursue relations with both
continental neighbors.
We are working very closely with the Japanese in the
Philippines.

The GOJ has been supportive of the Aquino

government--Mrs. Aquino will visit Japan November 10-13--at
that time the GOJ is expected to announce additional financial
assistance, although probably less than the 100 billion yen
requested.
In other areas, Japan has continued to urge moves toward
peace on Iraq and Iran--drawing on its diplomatic relations
with Baghdad and Teheran.

Japan recently toughened its

economic sanctions against South Africa, working closely with
the EC.

Japan continues to support us in the caribbean, and in
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Central and Latin America.
our security relations with Japan have never been better.
This summer we saw the GOJ decide to participate in SDI; agree
to permit ROK-based

u.s.

aircraft to participate in U.S.-Japan

exercises; successful port calls by the first-ever
Tomahawk-capable U.S. Navy ships to visit Japan, including the
New Jersey; the first two defense technology transfers from
Japan to the

u.s.;

and a highly productive

u.s.

visit by

Defense Minister Kurihara.
During the year we conducted more than twenty joint
exercises, each resulting in even closer coordination and
valuable lessons for future planning and procurement.

The

Japanese government is spending more than $1.0 billion annually
in support of

u.s.

forces in Japan and public support for the

security relationship has never been higher.
We expect Japan to fund fully its current five year plan.
The decrease in the value of the dollar has helped Japanese
budget planners insofar as petroleum and

u.s.

weapons systems

are cheaper, but it has had the opposite effect on us.
working with

u.s.

we are

Forces Japan to develop ways in which the

Japanese government can increase its contribution to our
operations.
Japan took an important step last winter regarding our
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earlier INF proposal.

For the first time the Japanese

forcefully made suggestions on a strategic issue.

The Japanese

appreciate the differences between soviet SS-20s in Europe and
in Asia, but reductions in Europe without some equivalent
agreement on Asian SS-20s would suggest that the u.s. and
.,.. k..;:( ct~~
Europeans were neglecting Japan•s1Jasic security needs. The
Japanese are also faced with another set of problems--separate
treatment for Asian SS-20s runs the risk of giving the soviets
an opportunity to equate their INF deployments with our
deployments in the Pacific and to link reductions in U.S.
access to Japanese facilities to further reductions in Asian
SS-20s.

Such a discussion would put needless strain on public

support for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation.
Japan's important decision to participate in SDI reflected
a desire not to be left behind if new technologies are
developed, but the most important consideration, was the prime
minister's desire to demonstrate Japan's solidarity as a member
of the Western alliance.
Looking to the future means examining Japan's surge into
super power economic status.

The appreciated yen is having a

series of important effects which go far beyond the U.S.-Japan
trade dimension:
-- As the yen climbs, it transforms Japan into a great
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world financial power; the world's biggest securities firm is
Japanese, as is the world's largest bank--and six of the top
ten banks are Japanese.
-- Structural changes, yen appreciation, and competition
from the NICs, are pushing Japan away from low and middle tech
industry and accelerating the move toward advanced technology
--robotics, new materials such as ceramics, biotechnology and
advanced electronics.
--Japan is expanding its foreign investments at an
astonishing rate; it is now the world's largest creditor
nation; direct investment in the U.S. exceeds $25 billion, and
is skyrocketing.

Portfolio investment in the

u. s.

will

probably exceed $SO billion this year.
--The strong yen is forcing Japanese industry to source
abroad and to move its lower-technology industry

~read?~

-IC.f'-~04.

But, despite the outcries of the industries caught by the
upward surge of the yen, farsighted Japanese welcome the
financial strength that it brings, and the structural changes
which it is forcing upon the economy and society.

Ironically,

the cumulative effect of structural economic changes in Japan
and the appreciation of the yen may well be to shake out the
least competitive companies, leaving the world with even
stiffer Japanese competition.
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All of this will have a powerful effect on Japan's
relations with its Asian neighbors and with us.

The

combination of great financial power, cutting edge technology
and strong international companies will make Japan a force to
be envied, wooed and feared by its neighbors.
We often observe that Japan is an insular nation
historically, preoccupied with its own affairs and disinclined
to international leadership or even to international systems
maintenance.

Japan is changing, but will it, can it, change as

rapidly as its economic and financial power is increasing?
Will Japan assume a position of responsibility which
corresponds to its new status as an economic superpower?
There is no simple, easy answer.

Indeed, it is in part

what the international community, mostly the U.S., will do that
will bring forth the Japanese response.

We need to do the

following:
--Keep hammering away at market access, the opening of the
Japanese economy to the

u.s.

and to all its trading partners;

--Maintain pressure for better and more responsible
international economic behavior:

capital market

liberalization, reorientation toward domestic demand-driven
growth, moderation of predatory corporate practices;
--consult with Japan as an equal partner on international
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trade, monetary and investment issues, and continue to
encourage Japan to expand and deepen its role in the IBRD, the
IMF, the GATT, the OECD and the international development banks;
--Remind Japan of its responsibilities toward the
developing countries, and in particular those of ASEAN,
regarding import volumes and composition, levels and
composition of economic assistance, direct investments and
technology transfer, all difficult issues for outsiders to
influence.
At the same time, we have a challenging agenda at home:
To reduce rapidly our huge budget deficit;
To build a less adversarial relationship between labor
and management, management and government;
-- To increase productivity, competitiveness, style of our
products and to make much more vigorous efforts to export these
quality goods;
-- For our businessmen, to take a hard look at
short-sighted business practices and construct strategies for
market growth;
If Japan and the United States have the will to carry
through on these agendas, we can be confident of our future, of
our relationship with Japan and of our role in the forthcoming
century of the Pacific.

JAPAN -- THE REGION AND THE WORLD

Japan is now the world's second greatest economic power.
At current exchange rates its per capita income is higher than
ours.

It is moving to number one in many areas of advanced

technology which we once dominated.

The power of the yen is

transforming Japan into a financial, as well as industrial,
giant.

The world's largest creditor, Japan finances a big

chunk of the

u.s.

budget deficit and thereby helps lower

interest rates in the

u.s.

At the same time, its economic relations not only with the

u.s.

but with other countries are already the source of

conflict.
history.

The Japanese trade surplus is the biggest in
The great Pacific economic power--and one of our

closest allies and friends-- finds itself attacked in the
Congress, in ASEAN, and by the EC.

u.s.

China and Korea complain.

How this great industrial and financial powerhouse adjusts to
this mounting criticism is of great importance to all of us.
In my view the two events of greatest importance to
U.S.-Japan relations during the past year were the near 50 per
cent appreciation of the yen against the dollar and the
overwhelming electoral victory of Prime Minister Nakasone's
Liberal Democratic Party in the July general election.

The
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former has brought about a reduction in the volume of Japan's
exports and should in a few months also result in an
improvement in the bilateral trade imbalance.

It also has

hastened the transformation of the Japanese economy.
The latter should be seen as a confirmation of the
direction of Japanese policy--and of Japanese foreign and
domestic policy and of Japan's membership in the Western
alliance--and a ringing personal endorsement of the Prime
Minister.
The LDP victory was the result of several factors.
-- First, there is general satisfaction with the present
state of affairs in Japan.

Despite high prices and creeping

unemployment, Japanese are enjoying an unprecedentedly high
standard of living.
-- Second, the LDP is well-organized, its leadership highly
talented, and its workers dedicated.
-- Third, organized labor's support for the socialist party
was weakening at a faster pace than previously thought--largely
assisted by the privatization of a number of public
corporations.
-- Fourth, voters did not see the opposition as a credible
alternative.
--Most importantly, in my view, the extraordinary

3

popularity of the prime minister helped a number of voters make
up their minds in favor of the LDP.

Although few in the party

will admit it, Mr. Nakasone's personal popularity--at record
levels for the past two years--was a major factor in the
overwhelming LDP victory.
Because the election result will assure continuity and
stability--including the continuation in office for another
year or more of the prime minister--it is good for
interests.

u.s.

However, the LDP victory should not be viewed as a

sign that the adjustment of our relations will proceed more
quickly, or that it will be any easier for Japan to undertake
the macro-economic and structural reforms which are necessary.
It is more likely that the increase in the LDP Lower House
seats will mean an increase in the influence of special
interest groups which tend to obstruct moves for economic
adjustment and change.
Nonetheless, Prime Minister Nakasone remains the strongest
advocate of market opening and the "internationalization" of
Japan.

He is way ahead of the mainstream of his party and of

much of the bureaucracy.

He has a greater appreciation for

Japan's role in the world, and the impact Japan has had on the
world economy in the past twenty years, and the impact it will
continue to have.

We can count on him to continue the fight to
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enhance the free trade system, but we must realize that his
power is restricted by the nature of the political system.
At the same time, however, Nakasone is a complex
individual.

Before becoming prime minister he was widely

regarded as a strong nationalist.

He was viewed with suspicion

by many in the media that he would turn Japan dangerously to
the right if given the opportunity and jeopardize the progress
toward genuinely representative institutions since the war.
There were many people who were worried that Nakasone would
become a Japanese Gaullist and carve out a Japanese role at our
expense.
In reality, Mr. Nakasone turned out to be a pragmatist and
a strong believer in the importance of a close U.S.-Japan
relationship.

While he has not discarded his agenda to restore

national pride and revamp some postwar institutions, he has
proven to be one of the most broad-minded, internationalist
prime ministers in recent memory.

He has worked hard at

diplomatic tasks--the special "Ron-Yasu" relationship is
genuine.
Mr. Nakasone is likely to remain in office through next
year's ordinary Diet session--May or June.
anybody's guess.

After that, it's

There are some who advocate that he step down

while he is still on a roll.

Others feel he might stay in
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office until the end of 1988.

I don't know who will take his

place.

The odds change on the three "new leaders" almost

weekly.

It is important to note, however, that while Mr.

Nakasone has been very helpful to us, all three new leaders are
moderate, experienced statesmen who believe that Japan cannot
exist without the closest relationship with the United States;
they have built their careers on this belief.

Furthermore, we

have worked closely with all three.

u.s.

As far as

interests

are concerned, the change of leadership, when it comes, will be
one of style, not substance.
Thus far, I am confident that, while some Japanese are
becoming irritated with Congress' verbal attacks and with wave
after wave of trade negotiators taking up increasingly
sensitive issues, most of the leadership--and the media--is
fully aware that Japan cannot afford to avoid taking actions to
preserve the free market trading system.

Most understand that

whether foreign accusations of protectionist practices are
right or wrong, Japan's $60 billion surplus with the rest of
the world could lead to disaster not only for Japan but for the
whole trading system if doors started to close for Japanese
products.

Many outsiders consider the Japanese insular,

condescending or even arrogant--I do not--but most Japanese are
aware that they live in an interdependent world and that they
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must adjust to keep from being isolated.
In the past 40 years Japan's pursuit of its foreign policy
goals has been quiet and low key but, on the whole, effective.
During the past year Japan has become more active.

Of

particular note has been an expanded dialogue with the soviet
Union which will probably lead to a summit early next year.
Gorbachev's more flexible diplomacy has put some pressure on
the Japanese government to make concessions and Mr. Nakasone
has a sense of history that will draw him toward the first
summit between a Japanese prime minister and a Soviet leader in
more than 15 years.

There is little inclination, however, in

any party or in the government to compromise on what for the
Japanese is the main issue:
Territories.

return of the Northern

Without a territorial concession by the soviets,

there is little likelihood that much progress will be made.

In

any event, in contrast to the 1970s when energy was expensive
and Japan looked to the Soviet Union as a growth market, there
is now a worldwide surplus of most things Japan needs.

And,

the Japanese are becoming increasingly wary of Soviet interest
in high technology.

Thus, while a summit will probably take

place, the results are likely to be cosmetic rather than
substantive.
Japan has continued to develop its relations with China and
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Korea, successfully overcoming the setbacks that resulted from
the textbook problem and ill-conceived remarks by former
Education Minister Fujio.

Mr. Nakasone's visit to the opening

of the Asian games in Seoul was a great success and represents
his laudable commitment to stabilizing Japan-ROK relations.
His visit to China next month should further improve relations
as well as send a signal to the soviets that he intends to
pursue relations with both of his continental neighbors.
One area where we are working very closely with the
Japanese is in the Philippines.

The GOJ has been supportive of

the Aquino government and Mrs. Aquino will visit Japan November
10-13.

At that time the GOJ is expected to announce additional

financial assistance for the Philippines, although probably
less than the 100 billion yen requested.
In other areas, Japan has continued to urge moves toward
peace on Iraq and Iran--drawing on its diplomatic relations
with Baghdad and Teheran.

Japan recently toughened its

economic sanctions against south Africa, working closely with
the EC, and in doing so displayed an awareness of its
international responsibilities.

Japan continues to support us

in the caribbean, and in central and Latin America.
Our security relations with Japan have never been better.
This summer alone we saw the GOJ decide to participate in SDI;
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agree to permit ROK-based

u.s.

aircraft to participate in

U.S.-Japan exercises; successful port calls by the first-ever
Tomahawk-capable

u.s.

Navy ships to visit Japan, including the

New Jersey; completion of the first two defense technology
transfers from Japan to the U.S.; and a highly productive

u.s.

visit by Defense Minister Kurihara.
During the year we conducted more than twenty joint
exercises, each resulting in even closer coordination between
our forces and valuable lessons for future planning and
procurement.

The Japanese government is spending more than

$1.0 billion annually in support of U.S. forces in Japan and
public support for the security relationship has never been
higher.

I am also happy to report that community relations are

at an all time high.
We expect Japan to fund fully its current five year plan.
The decrease in the value of the dollar has helped Japanese
budget planners insofar as petroleum and

u.s.

weapons systems

are cheaper, but it has had the opposite effect on us.
working with

u.s.

we are

Forces Japan to develop ways in which the

Japanese government can increase its contribution to our
operations in accordance with the SOFA and earlier
understandings.
Japan took an important step last winter when it made some
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suggestions regarding our earlier INF proposal.

For the first

time the Japanese came to us on a strategic issue and stated
their case forcefully.

The Japanese appreciate the differences

between the role of the Soviet SS-20s in Europe and those in
Asia, but for us to agree on reductions in Europe without some
equivalent agreement on the Asian SS-20s would make it appear
that the

u.s.

and Europeans were neglecting Japan's basic

security needs.

In addition, the Japanese are faced with

another set of problems--separate treatment for Asian SS-20s
runs the risk of giving the Soviets an opportunity to equate
their INF deployments with our deployments in the Pacific
region and to insist on reductions in U.S. access to Japanese
facilities before further reductions in Asian SS-20s.

This

kind of discussion would put needless strain on public support
for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation.
Japan also took an important step when it made the decision
to participate in SDI.

Although the decision included a desire

not to be left behind if new technologies are developed, the
most important consideration, was the prime minister's desire
to demonstrate Japan's solidarity as a member of the Western
alliance.
Looking to the future means examining Japan's surge into
super power economic status.

The appreciated yen is having a
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series of important effects which go far beyond the U.S.-Japan
trade dimension:
-- As the yen climbs, it transforms Japan into a great
world financial power; the world's biggest securities firm is
Japanese, as is the world's largest bank--and six of the top
ten banks are Japanese.
-- Structural changes, yen appreciation, and competition
from the NICs, are pushing Japan away from low and middle tech
industry--textiles and steel--and accelerating the move toward
advanced technology which is little sensitive to exchange
rates:

robotics, new materials such as ceramics, biotechnology

and advanced electronics.
--Japan is expanding its foreign investments at an
astonishing rate; it is now the world's largest creditor
nation; direct investment in the
is skyrocketing.

u.s.

exceeds $25 billion, and

Portfolio investment in the

u.s.

will

probably exceed $50 billion this year.
--The strong yen is forcing Japanese industry to source
abroad and to move its lower-technology industry to ASEAN, and
to the

u.s.

But, despite the outcries of the industries caught by the
upward surge of the yen, farsighted Japanese welcome the great
financial strength that it brings, and the structural changes

ll

which it is forcing upon the

e~onomy

and society.

Ironically,

cumulative effect of structural economic changes in Japan and
the appreciation of the yen may well be to shake out the least
competitive companies, leaving the world with even stiffer
Japanese competition.
All of this will have a powerful effect on Japan's
relations with its Asian neighbors and with us.

The

combination of great financial power, cutting edge technology
and strong international companies will make Japan a force to
be envied, wooed and feared by its neighbors.
We often observe that Japan is an insular nation, that it
has, over its history tended to be inwardly turned, preoccupied
with its own affairs and disinclined to international
leadership or even to international systems maintenance.

Japan

is changing, but will it, can it, change as rapidly as its
economic and financial power is increasing?

In other words,

will Japan assume a position of responsibility which
corresponds to its new status as an economic superpower?
There is no simple, easy answer.

Indeed, it is in part

what the international community, mostly the
will bring forth the Japanese response.

u.s.,

will do that

we need to do the

following:
--Keep hammering away at market access, the opening of the
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Japanese economy to the U.S. and to all its trading partners;
--Maintain pressure for better and more responsible
international economic behavior:

capital market

liberalization, reorientation toward domestic demand-driven
growth, moderation of predatory corporate practices;
--Consult with Japan as an equal partner on international
trade, monetary and investment issues, and continue to
encourage Japan to expand and deepen its role in the IBRD, the
IMF, the GATT, the OECD and the international development banks;
--Remind Japan of its responsibilities toward the
developing countries, and in particular those of ASEAN,
regarding import volumes and composition, levels and
composition of economic assistance, direct investments and
technology transfer, all difficult issues for outsiders to
influence.
At the same time, we have a challenging agenda at home:
To reduce rapidly our huge budget deficit;
To build a less adversarial relationship between labor
and management, management and government;
-- To increase productivity, competitiveness, style of our
products and to make much more vigorous efforts to export these
quality goods;
-- For our businessmen, to take a hard look at
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short-sighted business practices and construct strategies for
market growth;

If Japan and the United States have the will to carry
through on these agendas, we can be confident of our future, of
our relationship with Japan and of our role in the forthcoming
century of the Pacific.

